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Abstract—Due to the use of commodity software and hardware,
crash-stop and Byzantine failures are likely to be more prevalent
in today’s large-scale distributed storage systems. Regenerating
codes have been shown to be a more efficient way to disperse
information across multiple nodes and recover crash-stop failures
in the literature. In this paper, we present the design of regen-
eration codes in conjunction with integrity check that allows
exact regeneration of failed nodes and data reconstruction in
presence of Byzantine failures. A progressive decoding mecha-
nism is incorporated in both procedures to leverage computation
performed thus far. The fault-tolerance and security properties
of the schemes are also analyzed.
Index Terms—Network storage, Regenerating code, Byzantine
failures, Reed-Solomon code, Error-detection code
I. INTRODUCTION
Storage is becoming a commodity due to the emergence
of new storage media and the ever decreasing cost of conven-
tional storage devices. Reliability, on the other hand, continues
to pose challenges in the design of large-scale distributed
systems such as data centers. Today’s data centers operate
on commodity hardware and software, where both crash-
stop and Byzantine failures (as a result of software bugs,
attacks) are likely the norm. To achieve persistent storage, one
common approach is to disperse information pertaining to a
data file (the message) across nodes in a network. For instance,
with (n, k) maximum-distance-separable (MDS) codes such as
Reed-Solomon (RS) codes, data is encoded and stored across
n nodes and, an end user or a data collector can retrieve the
original data file by accessing any k of the storage nodes, a
process referred to as data reconstruction.
Upon failure of any storage node, data stored in the failed
node needs to be regenerated (recovered) to maintain the
functionality of the system. A straightforward way for data
recovery is to first reconstruct the original data and then
regenerate the data stored in the failed node. However, it is
wasteful to retrieve the entire B symbols of the original file,
just to recover a small fraction of that stored in the failed node.
A more efficient way is to use the regenerating codes which
was introduced in the pioneer works by Dimakis et al. in [1],
[2]. A tradeoff can be made between the storage overhead
and the repair bandwidth needed for regeneration. Minimum
Storage Regenerating (MSR) codes minimize first, the amount
of data stored per node, and then the repair bandwidth,
while Minimum Bandwidth Regenerating (MBR) codes carry
out the minimization in the reverse order. The design of
regenerating codes have received much attention in recent
years [3]–[10]. Most notably, Rashi et al. proposed optimal
exact-Regenerating codes using a product-matrix reconstruc-
tion that recover exactly the same stored data of the failed node
(and thus the name exact-regenerating) [10]. Existing work
assumes crash-stop behaviors of storage nodes. However, with
Byzantine failures, the stored data may be tampered resulting
in erroneous data reconstruction and regeneration.
In this paper, we consider the problem of exact regeneration
for Byzantine fault tolerance in distributed storage networks.
Two challenging issues arise when nodes may fail arbitrarily.
First, we need to verify whether the regenerated or recon-
structed data is correct. Second, efficient algorithms are needed
that incrementally retrieve additional stored data and perform
data-reconstruction and regeneration when errors have been
detected. Our work is inspired by [10] and makes the following
new contributions:
• We present the detailed design of an exact-regenerating
code with error correction capability.1
• We devise a procedure that verifies the correctness of
regenerated/reconstructed data.
• We propose progressive decoding algorithms for data-
reconstruction and regeneration that leverages computa-
tion performed thus far.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give an
overview of regenerating codes and RS codes in Section II to
prepare the readers with necessary background. The design of
error-correcting exact regenerating code for the MSR points
and MBR points are presented in Section III and Section IV,
respectively. Analytical results on the fault tolerance and
security properties of the proposed schemes are given in
Section V. Related work is briefly surveyed in Section VI.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
1The encoding process is the same as that given in [10] except that an
explicit encoding matrix is given in this work.
1
2II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Regenerating Codes
Regenerating codes achieve bandwidth efficiency in the
regeneration process by storing additional symbols in each
storage node or accessing more storage nodes. Let α be the
number of symbols over finite field GF (q) stored in each
storage node and β ≤ α the number of symbols downloaded
from each storage during regeneration. To repair the stored
data in the failed node, a helper node accesses d surviving
nodes with the total repair bandwidth dβ. In general, the
total repair bandwidth is much less than B. A regenerating
code can be used not only to regenerate coded data but also
to reconstruct the original data symbols. Let the number of
storage nodes be n. An [n, k, d] regenerating code requires
at least k and d surviving nodes to ensure successful data-
reconstruction and regeneration [10], respectively. Clearly,
k ≤ d ≤ n− 1.
The main results given in [2], [3] are the so-called cut-set
bound on the repair bandwidth. It states that any regenerating
code must satisfy the following inequality:
B ≤
k−1∑
i=0
min{α, (d− i)β} . (1)
Minimizing α in (1) results in a regenerating code with
minimum storage requirement; and minimizing β results in
that with minimum repair bandwidth. It is impossible to have
minimum values both on α and β concurrently, and thus
there exists a tradeoff between storage and repair bandwidth.
The two extreme points in (1) are referred as the minimum
storage regeneration (MSR) and minimum bandwidth regen-
eration (MBR) points, respectively. The values of α and β for
MSR point can be obtained by first minimizing α and then
minimizing β:
α =
B
k
β =
B
k(k − d+ 1)
. (2)
Reversing the order of minimization we have β and α for
MBR as
β =
2B
k(2d− k + 1)
α =
2dB
k(2d− k + 1)
. (3)
As defined in [10], an [n, k, d] regenerating code with parame-
ters (α, β,B) is optimal if i) it satisfies the cut-set bound with
equality, and ii) neither α and β can be reduced unilaterally
without violating the cut-set bound. Clearly, both MSR and
MBR codes are optimal regenerating codes.
It has been proved that when designing [n, k, d] MSR or
MBR codes, it suffices to consider those with β = 1 [10].
Throughout this paper, we assume that β = 1 for code design.
Hence (2) and (3) become
α = d− k + 1
B = k(d− k + 1) = kα (4)
and
α = d
B = kd− k(k − 1)/2 , (5)
respectively, when β = 1.
There are two ways to regenerate data for a failed node. If
the replacement data generated is exactly the same as those
stored in the failed node, we call it the exact regeneration.
If the replacement data generated is only to guarantee the
data-reconstruction and regeneration properties, it is called
functional regeneration. In practice, exact regeneration is more
desired since there is no need to inform each node in the
network regarding the replacement. Through this paper, we
only consider exact regeneration and design exact-regenerating
codes with error-correction capabilities.
B. Reed-Solomon codes
Since Reed-Solomon (RS) codes will be used in the design
of regenerating codes, we briefly describe the encoding and
decoding mechanisms of RS codes next.
RS codes are the most well-known error-correction codes.
They not only can recover data when nodes fail, but also can
guarantee recovery when a subset of nodes are Byzantine. RS
codes operate on symbols of m bits, where all symbols are
from finite field GF (2m). An [n, d] RS code is a linear code,
with parameters n = 2m − 1 and n− d = 2t , where n is the
total number of symbols in a codeword, d is the total number
of information symbols, and t is the symbol-error-correction
capability of the code.
Encoding: Let the sequence of d information symbols
in GF (2m) be u = [u0, u1, . . . , ud−1] and u(x) be the
information polynomial of u represented as2
u(x) = u0 + u1x+ · · ·+ ud−1x
d−1 .
The codeword polynomial, c(x), corresponding to u(x) can
be encoded as
c(x) = u(x)xn−d + (u(x)xn−d mod g(x)) , (6)
where g(x) is a generator polynomial of the RS code. It is
well-known that g(x) can be obtained as
g(x) = (x− ab)(x − ab+1) · · · (x− ab+2t−1)
= g0 + g1x+ g2x
2 + · · ·+ g2tx
2t , (7)
where a is a generator (or a primitive element) in GF (2m), b
an arbitrary integer, and gi ∈ GF (2m). The RS code defined
by (6) is a systematic code, where the information symbols
u0, u1, . . . , ud−1 occur as coefficients (symbols) in c(x).
2We use polynomial and vectorized representations of information symbols,
codewords, received symbols and errors interchangeably in this work.
3Fig. 1. Block diagram of RS decoding. Above each block, the corresponding existing algorithms are indicated.
Another encoding method for RS codes is the encoder
proposed by Reed and Solomon [11], where the codeword
c corresponding to the information sequence u is
c = [u(a0), u(a1), u(a2), · · · , u(an−1)] . (8)
When b = 1, the codes generated by (6) and (8) are identical.
In this work, we adopt the later encoding method.
Decoding: The decoding process of RS codes is more
complex. A complete description can be found in [12].
Let r(x) be the received polynomial and r(x) = c(x) +
e(x) + γ(x) = c(x) + λ(x), where e(x) =
∑n−1
j=0 ejx
j is the
error polynomial, γ(x) =
∑n−1
j=0 γjx
j the erasure polynomial,
and λ(x) =
∑n−1
j=0 λjx
j = e(x)+ γ(x) the errata polynomial.
Note that g(x) and (hence) c(x) have αb, αb+1, . . . , αb+2t−1
as roots. This property is used to determine the error locations
and recover the information symbols.
The RS codes are optimal as it provides the largest separa-
tion among code words, and an [n, d] RS code can recover
from any v errors as long as v ≤ ⌊n−d−s2 ⌋, where s is
the number of erasure (or irretrievable symbols). The basic
procedure of RS decoding is shown in Figure 1. The last
step in this figure is not necessary if a systematic RS code
is applied; otherwise, the last step of the decoding procedure
involves solving a set of linear equations, and can be made
efficient by the use of Vandermonde generator matrices [13].
The decoding that handles both error and erasure is called the
error-erasure decoding.
In GF (2m), addition is equivalent to bit-wise exclusive-
or (XOR), and multiplication is typically implemented with
multiplication tables or discrete logarithm tables. To reduce the
complexity of multiplication, Cauchy Reed-Solomon (CRS)
codes [14] have been proposed to use a different construction
of the generator matrix, and convert multiplications to XOR
operations for erasure. However, CRS codes incur the same
complexity as RS codes for error correction.
III. ENCODING AND DECODING OF ERROR-CORRECTING
EXACT-REGENERATING CODES FOR THE MSR POINTS
In this section, we demonstrate how to perform error cor-
rection on MSR codes designed to handle Byzantine failures
by extending the code construction in [10]. It has been proved
in [10] that an MSR code C ′ with parameters [n′, k′, d′] for
any 2k′ − 2 ≤ d′ ≤ n′ − 1 can be constructed from an MSR
code C with parameters [n = n′ + i, k = k′ + i, d = d′ + i],
where d = 2k− 2 and i = d′ − 2k′ + 2. Furthermore, if C is
linear, so is C ′. Hence, it is sufficient to design an MSR code
for d = 2k − 2. When d = 2k − 2 we have
α = d− k + 1 = k − 1 = d/2
and
B = kα = α(α + 1) .
We assume that the symbols in data are elements from
GF (2m). Hence, the total data in bits is mB bits for β = 1.
A. Verification for Data-Reconstruction
Since we need to design codes with Byzantine fault toler-
ance it is necessary to perform integrity check after the original
data is reconstructed. Two common verification mechanisms
can be used: CRC and hash function. Both methods add
redundancy to the original data before they are encoded. Here
we adopt CRC since it is simple to implement and requires
less redundancy.
CRC uses a cyclic code (CRC code) such that each informa-
tion sequence can be verified using its generator polynomial
with degree r, where r is the redundant bits added to the
information sequence [12], [15]. The amount of errors that
can be detected by a CRC code is related to the number of
redundant bits. A CRC code with r redundant bits cannot
detect ( 12r )100% portion of errors or more. For example,
when r = 32, the mis-detection error probability is on the
order of 10−10. Since the size of original data is usually
large, the redundancy added by imposing a CRC code is
relatively small. For example, for a [100, 20, 38] MSR code
with α = 19, B = 19 × 20 = 380, we need to operate on
GF (211) such that the total bits for original data are 4180. If
r = 32, then only 0.77% redundancy is added. Hence, in the
following, we assume that the CRC checksum has been added
to the original data and the resultant size is B symbols.
B. Encoding
We arrange the information sequence m =
[m0,m1, . . . ,mB−1] into an information vector U with
size α× d such that
uij =
{
uji = mk1 for i ≤ j ≤ α
u(j−α)i = mk2 for i+ α ≤ j ≤ 2α
,
where k1 = (i − 1)(α + 1) − i(i + 1)/2 + j and k2 = (α +
1)(i − 1 + α/2) − i(i + 1)/2 + (j − α). Let U = [A1A2].
From the above construction, Aj’s are symmetric matrix with
dimension α× α for j = 1, 2.
In this encoding, each row of for the information vector U
produces a codeword of length n. An [n, d = 2α] RS code is
adopted to construct the MSR code. In particular, for the ith
row of U , the corresponding codeword is
[pi(a
0 = 1), pi(a
1), . . . , pi(a
n−1)] , (9)
4where pi(x) is a polynomial with all elements in the ith row
of U as its coefficients, that is, pi(x) =
∑d−1
j=0 uijx
j
, and a is
a generator of GF (2m). In matrix form, we have
U ·G = C,
where
G =


1 1 · · · 1
a0 a1 · · · an−1
(a0)2 (a1)2 · · · (an−1)2
.
.
.
(a0)d−1 (a1)d−1 · · · (an−1)d−1


,
and C is the codeword vector with dimension (α×n). Finally,
the ith column of C is distributed to storage node i for 1 ≤
i ≤ n.
The generator matrix G of the RS code can be reformulated
as
G =


1 1 · · · 1
a0 a1 · · · an−1
(a0)2 (a1)2 · · · (an−1)2
.
.
.
(a0)α−1 (a1)α−1 · · · (an−1)α−1
(a0)α1 (a1)α1 · · · (an−1)α1
(a0)αa0 (a1)αa1 · · · (an−1)αan−1
(a0)α(a0)2 (a1)α(a1)2 · · · (an−1)α(an−1)2
.
.
.
(a0)α(a0)α−1 (a1)α(a1)α−1 · · · (an−1)α(an−1)α−1


=
[
G¯
G¯∆
]
,
where, G¯ contains the first α rows in G and ∆ is a diagonal
matrix with (a0)α, (a1)α, (a2)α, . . . , (an−1)α as diagonal
elements. It is easy to see that the α symbols stored in storage
node i is
U ·
[
gTi
(ai−1)αgTi
]
= A1g
T
i + (a
i−1)αA2g
T
i ,
where gTi is the ith column in G¯.
A final remark is that each column in G can be generated
by knowing the index of the column and the generator a.
Therefore, each storage node does not need to store the entire
G to perform exact-regeneration.
C. Decoding for Data-Reconstruction
The generator polynomial of the RS code encoded by (9)
has an−d, an−d−1, . . . , a as roots [12]. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that the data collector retrieves encoded
symbols from k storage nodes j0, j1, . . . , jk−1. First,
the information sequence m is recovered by the procedure
given in [10]. Note that the procedure in [10] requires that
(a0)α, (a1)α, (a2)α, . . . , (an−1)α all be distinct. This can
be guaranteed if this code is over GF (2m) for m ≥ ⌈log2 nα⌉.
If the recovered information sequence does not pass the
CRC, then we need to perform the error-erasure decoding.
In addition to the received encoded symbols from k storage
nodes, the data collector needs to retrieve the encoded symbols
from d+2− k storage nodes of the remaining storage nodes.
The data collector then performs error-erasure decoding to
obtain C˜, the first d columns of the codeword vector. Let Gˆ
be the first d columns of G. Then the recovered information
sequence can be obtained from
U˜ = C˜ · Gˆ−1, (10)
where Gˆ−1 is the inverse of Gˆ and it always exists. If the
recovered information sequence passes the CRC, it is done;
otherwise, two more symbols need to be retrieved. The data
collector continues the decoding process until it successfully
recover the correct information sequence or no more storage
nodes can be accessed. In each step, the progressive decoding
that we proposed in [16] is applied to reduce the computation
complexity. Note that the RS code used is capable of correcting
up to ⌊(n− d)/2⌋ errors.
The decoding algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1. Note
that, in practice, Algorithm 1 will be repeated β times for each
retrieved symbol when β > 1.
Algorithm 1: Decoding of MSR Codes for Data-
Reconstruction
begin
The data collector randomly chooses k storage nodes
and retrieves encoded data, Yα×k;
Perform the procedure given in [10] to recover m˜;
if CRCTest(m˜) = SUCCESS then
return m˜;
else
Retrieve d− k more encoded data from remaining
storage nodes and merge them into Yα×d;
i← d;
while i ≤ n− 2 do
i← i+ 2;
Retrieve two more encoded data from
remaining storage nodes and merge them into
Yα×i;
Perform progressive error-erasure decoding
on each row in Y to recover C˜;
Obtain U˜ by (10) and convert it to m˜;
if CRCTest(m˜) = SUCCESS then
return m˜;
return FAIL;
D. Verification for Regeneration
To verify whether the recovered data are the same as those
stored in the failed node, integrity check is needed. However,
such check should be performed based on information stored
on nodes other than the failed node. We consider two mech-
anisms for verification.
In this first scheme, each storage node keeps the CRC
checksums for the rest n− 1 storage nodes. When the helper
accesses d surviving storage nodes, it also asks for the CRC
checksums for the failed node from them. Using the majority
vote on all receiving CRC checksums, the helper can obtain
5the correct CRC checksum if no more than ⌊(d − 1)/2⌋
accessed storage nodes are compromised. To see the storage
complexity of this scheme, let us take a numerical example.
Consider a [100, 20, 38] MSR code with α = 19, B =
4.18MB,β = 1000. The total bits stored in each node
is then 19 × 11 × 1000 = 209000 bits. If a 32-bit CRC
checksum is added to each storage node, the redundancy is
r(n − 1)/βαm = 32 × 99/209000 ≈ 1.5% and the extra
bandwidth for transmitting the CRC checksums is around
rd/βαm = 1216/418000 ≈ 0.3%. Hence, both redundancy
for storage and bandwidth are manageable for large β’s.
When β is small, we adopt an error-correcting code to
encode the r-bit CRC checksum. This can improve the storage
and bandwidth efficiency. First we select the operating finite
field GF (2m′) such that 2m′ ≥ n− 1. Then an [n− 1, k′] RS
code with k′ = ⌈r/m′⌉ is used to encode the CRC checksum.
Note that this code is different from the RS code used for MSR
data regenerating. In encoding the CRC checksum of a storage
node into n − 1 symbols and distributing them to the n − 1
other storage nodes, extra (n− 1)m′ bits are needed on each
storage node. When the helper accesses d storage nodes to
repair the failed node i, these nodes also send out the symbols
associated with the CRC checksum for node i. The helper
then can perform error-erasure decoding to recover the CRC
checksum. The maximum number of compromised storage
nodes among the accessed d nodes that can be handled by
this approach is ⌊(d− k′)/2⌋ and the extra bandwidth is dm′.
Since m′ is much smaller than n − 1 and r, the redundancy
for storage and bandwidth can be reduced.
E. Decoding for Regeneration
Let node i be the failed node to be recovered. During
regeneration, the helper accesses s surviving storage nodes,
where d ≤ s ≤ n− 1. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the storage nodes accessed are j0, j1,. . ., js−1. Every
accessed node takes the inner product between its α symbols
and
gi = [1, (a
i−1)1, (ai−1)2, . . . , (ai−1)α−1] , (11)
where gi can be generated by index i and the generator
a, and sends the resultant symbol to the helper. Since the
MSR code is a linear code, the resultant symbols transmitted,
yj0 , yj1 , yj2 , . . . , yjs−1 , can be decoded to the codeword c,
where
c = gi · (U ·G)
= (gi · U) ·G ,
if (n− s) + 2e < n− d+ 1, where e is the number of errors
among the s resultant symbols. Multiplying c by the inverse
of the first d columns of G, i.e., Gˆ−1, one can recover
gi · U
which is equivalent to
gi · [A1 A2] = [gi ·A1 gi · A2] .
Recall that gi is the transpose of ith column of G¯, the first
α rows in G. Since Aj , for j = 1, 2, are symmetric matrices,
(giAj)
T = Ajg
T
i . The α symbols stored in the failed node i
can then be calculated as
(giA1)
T + (ai−1)α(giA2)
T . (12)
The progressive decoding procedure in [16] can be applied
in decoding yj0 , yj1 , yj2 , . . . , yjs−1 . First, the helper accesses
d storage nodes and decodes yj0 , yj1 , yj2 , . . . , yjd−1 to
obtain c and α symbols by (12). Then, it verifies the CRC
checksum. If the CRC check is passed, the regeneration
is successful; otherwise, two more surviving storage nodes
need to be accessed. Then the helper decodes the received
yj0 , yj1 , yj2 , . . . , yjd+1 to obtain c and recover α symbols.
The process repeats until sufficient number of correctly stored
data have been retrieved to recover the failed node. Again, in
practice, when β > 1, the decoding needs to be performed
β times to recover βα symbols before verifying the CRC
checksum. The data regenerating algorithm is summarized in
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Decoding of MSR Codes for Regeneration
begin
Assume node i is failed.
The helper randomly chooses d storage nodes;
Each chosen storage node combines its symbols as a
(β × α) matrix and multiply it by gi in (11);
The helper collects these resultant vectors as a
(β × d) matrix Y .
The helper obtains the CRC checksum for node i;
i← d;
repeat
Perform progressive error-erasure decoding on
each row in Y to recover C˜ (error-erasure
decoding performs β times);
M = C˜Gˆ−1, where Gˆ−1 is the inverse of the
first d columns of G;
Obtain the βα information symbols, s, from M
by the method given in (12);
if CRCTest(s) = SUCCESS then
return s;
else
i← i+ 2;
The helper accesses two more remaining
storage nodes;
Each chosen storage node combines its
symbols as a (β × α) matrix and multiply it
by gi given in (11);
The helper merges the resultant vectors into
Yβ×i;
until i ≥ n− 2;
return FAIL;
6IV. ENCODING AND DECODING OF ERROR-CORRECTING
EXACT-REGENERATING CODES FOR THE MBR POINTS
In this section we demonstrate that by selecting the same RS
codes as that for MSR codes and designing a proper decoding
procedure, the MBR codes in [10] can be extended to handle
Byzantine failures. Since the verification procedure for MBR
codes is the same as that of MSR codes, it is omitted.
A. Encoding
Let the information sequence m = [m0,m1, . . . ,mB−1] be
arranged into an information vector U with size α × d such
that
uij =


uji = mk1 for i ≤ j ≤ k
uji = mk2 for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ d, 1 ≤ j ≤ k
0 otherwise
,
where k1 = (i− 1)(k+1)− i(i+1)/2+ j and k2 = (i− k−
1)k + k(k + 1)/2 + j. In matrix form, we have
U =
[
A1 A
T
2
A2 0
]
, (13)
where A1 is a k× k matrix, A2 a (d− k)× k matrix, 0 is the
(d−k)× (d−k) zero matrix. Both A1 and A2 are symmetric.
It is clear that U has a dimension d× d (or α× d).
We apply an [n, d] RS code to encode each row of U . Let
pi(x) be the polynomial with all elements in ith row of U as its
coefficients. That is, pi(x) =
∑d−1
j=0 uijx
j
. The corresponding
codeword of pi(x) is thus
[pi(a
0 = 1), pi(a
1), . . . , pi(a
n−1)] . (14)
Recall that a is a generator of GF (2m). In matrix form, we
have
U ·G = C,
where
G =


1 1 · · · 1
a0 a1 · · · an−1
(a0)2 (a1)2 · · · (an−1)2
.
.
.
(a0)k−1 (a1)k−1 · · · (an−1)k−1
(a0)k (a1)k · · · (an−1)k
.
.
.
(a0)d−1 (a1)d−1 · · · (an−1)d−1


,
and C is the codeword vector with dimension (α × n). G is
called the generator matrix of the [n, d] RS code. G can be
divided into two sub-matrices as
G =
[
Gk
B
]
,
where
Gk =


1 1 · · · 1
a0 a1 · · · an−1
(a0)2 (a1)2 · · · (an−1)2
.
.
.
(a0)k−1 (a1)k−1 · · · (an−1)k−1


(15)
and
B =


(a0)k (a1)k · · · (an−1)k
.
.
.
(a0)d−1 (a1)d−1 · · · (an−1)d−1

 .
Note that Gk is a generator matrix of the [n, k] RS code and it
will be used in the decoding process for data-reconstruction.
B. Decoding for Data-Reconstruction
The generator polynomial of the RS code encoded by (15)
has an−k, an−k−1, . . . , a as roots [12]. Hence, the progressive
decoding scheme given in [16] can be applied to decode the
proposed code if there are errors in the retrieved data. Unlike
the decoding procedure given in III-C, where an [n, d] RS
decoder is applied, we need an [n, k] RS decoder for MBR
codes.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the data
collector retrieves encoded symbols from s storage nodes
j0, j1, . . . , js−1, k ≤ s ≤ n. Recall that α = d in MBR.
Hence, the data collector receives d vectors where each vector
has s symbols. Collecting the first k vectors as Yk and the
remaining d− k vectors as Yd−k. From (13), we can view the
codewords in the last d − k rows of C as being encoded by
Gk instead of G. Hence, the decoding procedure of [n, k] RS
codes can be applied on Yd−k to recover the codewords in the
last d − k rows of C. Let Gˆk be the first k columns of Gk
and C˜d−k be the recovered codewords in the last d− k rows
of C. A2 in U can be recovered as
A˜2 = C˜d−k · Gˆk
−1
. (16)
We then calculate A˜T2 · B and only keep the j0th, j1th, . . .,
js−1th columns of the resultant matrix as E, and subtract E
from Yk:
Y ′k = Yk − E . (17)
Applying the RS decoding algorithm again on Y ′k we can
recover A1 as
A˜1 = C˜k · Gˆk
−1
. (18)
CRC checksum is computed on the decoded information
sequence to verify the recovered data. If CRC is passed, the
data reconstruction is successful; otherwise the progressive
decoding procedure is applied, where two more storage nodes
need to be accessed from the remaining storage nodes in
each round until no further errors are detected. The data-
reconstruction algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 3.
C. Decoding for Regeneration
Decoding for regeneration with MBR is very similar to that
with MSR. After obtaining gi · U , we take its transposition.
Since U is symmetric, we have UT = U and
UT · gTi = U · g
T
i .
CRC check is performed on all βα symbols. If the CRC
check is passed, the βα symbols are the data stored in the
failed node; otherwise, the progressive decoding procedure is
applied.
7TABLE I
EVALUATION OF MSR AND MBR CODES
MSR code MBR code
Data-reconstruction Regeneration Data-reconstruction Regeneration
Fault-tolerant capability against erasures n− k n− d n− k n− d
Fault-tolerant capacity against Byzantine faults ⌊n−d
2
⌋ min{⌊n−d
2
⌋, ⌊ d−k
′
2
⌋} ⌊n−k
2
⌋ min{⌊n−d
2
⌋, ⌊ d−k
′
2
⌋}
Security strength under forgery attack min{k, ⌈n−d+2
2
⌉} − 1 min{d, ⌈n−d+2
2
⌉} − 1 min{k, ⌈n−k+2
2
⌉} − 1 min{d, ⌈n−d+2
2
⌉} − 1
Redundancy ratio on storage (bits) r
mkα−r
(n−1)m′
βαm
r
m(kd−k(k−1)/2)−r
(n−1)m′
βαm
Redundancy ratio on bandwidth (bits) · dm′
βmd
= m
′
βm
· dm
′
βmd
= m
′
βm
where k′ = ⌊ r
m′
⌋ and m′ = ⌈log2(n− 1)⌉
Algorithm 3: Decoding of MBR Codes for Data-
Reconstruction
begin
The data collector randomly chooses k storage nodes
and retrieves encoded data, Yd×k;
i← d;
repeat
Perform progressive error-erasure decoding on
last d− k rows in Y to recover C˜ (error-erasure
decoding performs d− k times);
Calculate A˜2 via (16);
Calculate A˜2 · B and obtain Y ′k via (17);
Perform progressive error-erasure decoding on Y ′k
to recover the first k rows in codeword vector
(error-erasure decoding performs k times);
Calculate A˜1 via (18);
Recover the information sequence s from A˜1 and
A˜2;
if CRCTest(s) = SUCCESS then
return s;
else
i← i+ 2;
Retrieve two more encoded data from
remaining storage nodes and merge them into
Yd×i;
until i ≥ n− 2;
return FAIL;
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide an analytical study of the
fault-tolerant capability, security strength, and storage and
bandwidth efficiency of the proposed schemes.
A. Fault-tolerant capability
In analyzing the fault-tolerant capability, we consider two
types of failures, namely crash-stop failures and Byzantine
failures. Nodes are assumed to fail independently (as opposed
in a coordinated fashion). In both cases, the fault-tolerant
capacity is measured by the maximum number of failures that
the system can handle to remain functional.
Crash-stop failure: Crash-stop failures can be viewed as
erasure in the codeword. Since at least k nodes need to be
available for data-reconstruction, it is easy to show that the
maximum number of crash-stop failures that can be tolerated
in data-reconstruction is n−k. For regeneration, d nodes need
to be accessed. Thus, the fault-tolerant capability is n−d. Note
that since live nodes all contain correct data, CRC checksum
is also correct.
Byzantine failure: In general, in RS codes, two additional
correct code fragments are needed to correct one erroneous
code fragments. However, in the case of data regeneration,
the capability of the helper to obtain the correct CRC check-
sum also matters. In the analysis, we assume that the error-
correction code is used in the process to obtain the correct
CRC checksum. Data regeneration will fail if the helper cannot
obtain the correct CRC checksum even when the number of
failed nodes is less than the maximum number of faults the
RS code can handle. Hence, we must take the minimum of
the capability of the RS code (in MBR and MSR) and the
capability to recover the correct CRC checksum. Thus, with
MSR and MBR code, ⌊n−d2 ⌋ and ⌊
n−k
2 ⌋ erroneous nodes
can be tolerated in data reconstruction. On the other hand,
the fault-tolerant capacity of MSR and MBR code for data
regeneration are both min
{
⌊n−d2 ⌋, ⌊
d−k′
2 ⌋
}
.
B. Security Strength
In analyzing the security strength, we consider forgery
attacks, where polluters [9], a type of Byzantine attackers, try
to disrupt the data-reconstruction and regenerating process by
forging data cooperatively. In other words, collusion among
polluters are considered. We want to determine the minimum
number of polluters to forge the data in data-reconstruction
and regeneration. The security strength is therefore one less
the number. Forgery in data regeneration is useful when an
attacker only has access to a small set of nodes but through the
data regeneration process “pollutes” the data on other storage
nodes and thus ultimately leads to valid but erroneous data-
reconstruction.
In data-reconstruction, for worst case analysis, we consider
the security strength such that only one row of U is modified.3
3Due to symmetry in U , most of the time, making changes on a row in U
results in changes on several rows simultaneously.
8Let the polluters be j0, j1, . . . , jv−1, who can collude to forge
the information symbols. Suppose that y is the forged row in
U . Let y˜ = y+u, where u is the real information symbols in
the row of U . Then, according to the RS encoding procedure,
we have
yG = (y˜ + u)G = y˜G+ uG = v + c, (19)
where c is the original data storage in storage nodes and v is
the modified data must be made by the polluters. Let the num-
ber of nonzero symbols in v is h. It is clear that h ≥ n−d+1,
where n−d+1 is the minimum Hamming distance of the RS
code, since v must be a codeword. For worst-case considera-
tion, we assume that h = n− d+ 1. In order to successfully
forge information symbols, the attacker must compromise
some storage nodes and make them to store the corresponding
encoded symbols in yG, the codeword corresponding to the
forged information symbols. If the attacker compromises k
storage nodes, then when the data collector happens to access
these compromised storage nodes, according to the decoding
procedure, the attack can forge the data successfully. Let the
attacker compromise b < k storage nodes. According the
decoding procedure, when h − b = n − d + 1 − b ≤ ⌊n−d2 ⌋,
where ⌊n−d2 ⌋ is the error-correction capability of the RS
code, the decoding algorithm still has chance to decode the
received vector to yG. Taking the smallest value of b we
have b = ⌈n−d+22 ⌉. Hence, the security strength for data-
reconstruction is min{k, ⌈n−d+22 ⌉} − 1 in MSR codes. Since
the [n, k] RS code is used in decoding for MBR codes, the
security strength for them becomes min{k, ⌈n−k+22 ⌉} − 1.
Next we investigate the forgery attack on regeneration. Since
computing the CRC checksum is a linear operation, there is
no need for the attacker to break the CRC checksum for the
failed node. It only needs to make the forged data with all zero
redundant bits. Hence, the security strength for regeneration
is min{d, ⌈n−d+22 ⌉} − 1.
It can be observe that CRC does not increase the security
strength in forgery attack. By using hash value, the security
strength can be increased since the operation to obtain hash
value is non-linear. In this case, the attacker not only needs
to obtain the original information data but also can forge hash
value. Hence, the security strength can be increased to at least
k−1 in data-reconstruction and at least d−1 for regeneration.4
C. Redundancy Ratios on Storage and Bandwidth
CRC checksums incur additional overhead in storage and
bandwidth consumption. The redundancy incurred for data-
construction is r bits, the size of CRC checksum. Each infor-
mation sequence is appended with the extra r bits such that it
can be verified after reconstruction. The number of information
bits is mkα− r for MSR codes and m(kd− k(k− 1)/2)− r
for MBR codes, respectively. For regeneration, we assume
that the [n− 1, k′] RS code is used to distribute the encoded
CRC symbols to n − 1 storage nodes, where k′ = ⌊ r
m′
⌋ and
4For regeneration, the security strength is max{d,min{k′, ⌈ d−k
′+2
2
⌉}}−
1 = d− 1 since k′ is usually less than d.
m′ = ⌈log2(n − 1)⌉. Since each storage node must store the
encoded CRC symbols for other n−1 storage nodes, the extra
storage required for it is (n − 1)m′ bits. The encoded data
symbols stored in each storage node is βαm bits.
The helper must obtain the correct CRC checksum for the
failed node to verify the correctness of the recovered data.
The d storage nodes accessed need to provide their stored data
associated with the CRC checksum of the failed node to the
helper. Since each piece has m′ bits, the total extra bandwidth
is dm′. The total bandwidth to repair the βα symbols stored
in the failed node is βmd.
Table I summarizes the quantitative results of fault-tolerate
capability, security strength, and redundancy ratio of the MSR
and MBR codes.
VI. RELATED WORK
Regenerating codes were introduced in the pioneer works
by Dimakis et al. in [1], [2]. In these works, the so-called
cut-set bound was derived which is the fundamental limit
for designing regenerating codes. In these works, the data-
reconstruction and regeneration problems were formulated as
a multicast network coding problem. From the cut-set bounds
between the source and the destination, the parameters of the
regenerating codes were shown to satisfy (1), which reveals
the tradeoff between storage and repair bandwidth. Those
parameters satisfying the cut-set bound with equality were also
derived.
The regeneration codes with parameters satisfying the cut-
set bound with equality were proposed in [3], [4]. In [3] a
deterministic construction of the generating codes with d =
n− 1 was presented. In [4], the network coding approach was
adopted to design the generating codes. Both constructions
achieved functional regeneration but exact regeneration.
Exact regeneration was considered in [5]–[7]. In [5], a
search algorithm was proposed to search for exact-regenerating
MSR codes with d = n − 1; however, no systematic con-
struction method was provided. In [6], the MSR codes with
k = 2, d = n − 1 were constructed by using the concept of
interference alignment, which was borrowed from the context
of wireless communications. A drawback of this approach is
that it operates on a finite field with a large size. In [7], the
authors provided an explicit method to construct the MBR
codes with d = n − 1. No computation is required for
these codes during the regeneration of a failed node. Explicit
construction of the MSR codes with d = k + 1 was also
provided; however, these codes can perform exact regeneration
only for a subset of failed storage nodes.
In [17], the authors proved that exact regeneration is im-
possible for MSR codes with [n, k, d < 2k − 3] when β = 1.
Based on interference alignment approach, a code construction
was provided for MSR codes with [n = d+1, k, d ≥ 2k− 1].
In [10], the explicit constructions for optimal MSR codes with
[n, k, d ≥ 2k − 2] and optimal MBR codes were proposed.
The construction was based on the product of tow matrices:
information matrix and encoding matrix. The information
9matrix (or its submatrices) is symmetric in order to have exact-
regeneration property.
The problem of security on regenerating codes were con-
sidered in [8], [9]. In [8], the authors considered the secu-
rity problem against eavesdropping and adversarial attackers
during the regeneration process. They derived upper bounds
on the maximum amount of information that can be stored
safely. An explicit code construction was given for d = n− 1
in the bandwidth-limited regime. The problem of Byzantine
fault tolerance for regenerating codes was considered in [9].
The authors studied the resilience of regenerating codes which
support multi-repairs. By using collaboration among new-
comers (helpers), upper bounds on the resilience capacity of
regenerating codes were derived. Even though our work also
deals with the Byzantine failures, it does not need to have
multiple helpers to recover the failures.
The progressive decoding technology for distributed storage
was first introduced in [16]. The scheme retrieved just enough
data from surviving storage nodes to recover the original
data in the presence of crash-stop and Byzantine failures.
The decoding was performs incrementally such that both
communication and computation cost are minimized.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered the problem of exact regen-
eration with error correction capability for Byzantine fault
tolerance in distributed storage networks. We showed the
Reed-Solomon codes combined with CRC checksum can be
used for both data-reconstruction and regenerating, realizing
MSR and MBR in the later case. Progressive decoding can
be applied in both applications to reduce the computation
complexity in presence of erroneous data. Analysis on the fault
tolerance, security, storage and bandwidth overhead shows that
the proposed schemes are effective without incurring too much
overhead.
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